

Mobile Mixing

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How long it takes so that traffic analysis does not provide any substantial information?


Example

single message

A○


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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destination of the message starting at A?

State of the art

1. intuition: *after a sufficiently long time the origins are hidden*
2. no proofs, case-by-case proof or artificial assumptions
3. no reasonable bounds

Related problems - mixes and onions

Mixes:

1. several messages enters a mix
2. the messages are recoded cryptographically
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Adversary model

Different adversary models:

- ▶ whole traffic can be observed (strong model)
- ▶ only a constant fraction of traffic can be observed (sometimes more realistic)

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Related problems – results on mixes

- ▶ many attacks and countermeasures for a dynamic adversary
- ▶ no security proofs except: a cascade of pairs of mixes, passive adversary – processing through $O(1)$ pairs is enough,
Gomułkiewicz, Klonowski, Kutylowski (ESORICS'2003)

Related problems – results on onions

- ▶ many attacks and countermeasures for a dynamic adversary
- ▶ strong adversary:
 - ▶ Rackoff, Simon (ACM STOC'93): polylogarithmic time (degree 11), special assumption: at stage i the messages stay inside groups of cardinality 2^i
 - ▶ Czumaj, Kanarek, Kutylowski, Loryś (ACM SODA'99): under the same assumptions - time $O(\log^2 n)$
- ▶ passive adversary:
 - ▶ Berman, Fiat, Ta-Shma (FC'2004) – $O(\log^4 n)$ steps for n messages,
 - ▶ Gomułkiewicz, Klonowski, Kutylowski (ISC'2004) – $O(\log n)$ steps

Our model

- ▶ **A message cannot be sent to any other node in a network in one step.**
- ▶ It can be sent only to the neighbor nodes.

Application – RFID-tags

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Problem: Anyone in range can contact an RFID-tag. Even if they cannot write any information, they can trace the tag!

Re-encryption of the RFID-tags does not automatically protect against traffic analysis.

Application – Mobile Agents

Mobile agents:

- ▶ program and data migrating through a network
- ▶ used for diverse purposes: processing and search of information in a distributed information system
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Goal: routes of the agents should remain hidden.

Application – Distributed Timestamping

Timestamping with Boomerang Onions:

- ▶ A time-stamping requests encoded in an onion.
- ▶ the onion is processed through an anonymous path which returns to the sender.
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Security problem: if traffic analysis succeeds, then an adversary can block timestamping requests of particular users and observe who is issuing timestamps

Process description – adversary view - On hobbits and the rings

The following process well describes our scenario:

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- ▶ Each hobbit is holding one *ring*. Some of them are magic rings.

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
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
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- ▶ The hobbits perform (independently) a random walk on a graph G .
- ▶ If some hobbits meet in a node they exchange their rings at random.
- ▶ An adversary observes the movements of the hobbits (but not how they exchange the rings) and tries to locate the magic ring(s).


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
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
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
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
Hobbits



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Main problem

How many steps of the hobbits are necessary until the adversary has no substantial advantage from observing the movements of the hobbits?

Anonymity Condition

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- ▶ probability distribution **conditioned on the traffic information** should be almost uniform
- ▶ **variation distance** as a measure of closeness of two probability distributions

Main result

Let:

- ▶ G – n -node regular graph with mixing time τ_G
- ▶ $m = \Theta(n)$ – hobbits
- ▶ $k \leq \frac{1}{2}m$ – magic rings

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Main Theorem

After $\lambda = \Omega(\tau_G^3 \cdot \log^6 n \cdot \log k)$ steps probability distribution of magic rings is close to the uniform distribution with high probability (over traffic information).

Proof outline

- ▶ Our problem is much different from locating the hobbits on random positions in graph G .
- ▶ “mixing” occurs dynamically - therefore an analysis is becomes harder.

Proof phases

1. solve the problem for one magic ring - *potential functions*
2. generalize to many magic rings - *path coupling*

The main technical contribution is part 1.

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- ▶ $\tau_H(P) = \min_t \{d_H(P; t) \leq 0.1\}$
- ▶ τ_G – *mixing time* of graph G (it describes time after which “a single hobbit is at a random location in G ”)

Key technical result

Key Theorem

Assume that the mixing time of G is $n^{o(1)}$.

Then with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{n}$ over the choices of P :

$$\tau_H(P) = O(\tau_G^3 \cdot \log^5 n)$$

Potential functions

- ▶ $g(P; t) = \sum_{i=1}^m \rho^2(P; i, t).$
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Some properties:

- ▶ $g(P; t)$ is a non-increasing function of t .
- ▶ It suffices to inspect when $d_H(P; t_0) \leq 0.1$.

Main Lemma

Lemma

Let $d_H(P; t_0) \geq 0.1$ for a pattern P . Then for certain τ_1, τ_0 :

$$E[g(P; t_0) - g(P; t_0 + \tau_1 + 1)] \geq \Omega(g(P; t_0) / (\tau_G^2 \log^3 n))$$

Corollary:

By definition $g \geq \frac{1}{7}m$, so finally $d_H(P; t_0) < 0.1$

Proof rationale:

if $d_H(P; t_0) \geq 0.1$, then there are many hobbits with high (low) probability of possessing the magic ring. When such hobbits meet, then probabilities get equal and the potential decreases substantially.

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- ▶ still unclear what is the **real** relationship between the convergence rate considered and the mixing time
- ▶ what about special classes of graphs occurring in practice